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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The starting point of this thesis is the twinning project: “Support to Turkey’s Capacity in 
Combating Illegal Migration and Establishment of Removal Centers for Illegal Migrants”1. 
The establishment of those removal centers is in major part financed by EU. They will 
“accommodate” irregular migrants2 “pending procedures for readmission to their home 
countries”.  
 
The financing of extraterritorial projects by EU is common. In this case, nevertheless, the 
final purpose of the project is to deprive individuals of their liberty. This measure in the 
case of migration has a quite different dimension from deprivation of liberty in criminal 
cases. The concerned individuals are not criminal, the aim of the measure is not to punish 
but to remove the persons from the territory in which they entered or stayed illegally. But 
still, depriving one’s of his or her liberty can have serious consequences, mainly when it 
does not meet international standards. Financing the facilities in which such deprivation of 
liberty takes place outside its territory cannot be neutral. 
 
For this reason such project must not be disregarded and its meaning having regard to the 
state of international law and relations on the question of migration must be appraised. This 
                                                 
1
 IPA decentralized National Progammes, Project number: TR 07 02 16, Twinning no: TR 07 IB JH 05, 
standard summary project file available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/turkey/financial-assistance/index_en.htm  see “Project Fiches 2007” 
2
 Though the project refers to “illegal migrants”, “irregular migrants” will be used to describe illegally staying 
 5 
thesis will seek to assess how such project fits in the contemporary international legal 
framework. 
Financing the creation of removal centers outside state’s territory is the illustration of a 
consequent change in the way migration is dealt with and of the importance of the 
deprivation of liberty in the fight against illegal migration.  
 
Migration policies have, indeed, known an important change in nature with EU being the 
main actor of it: the externalization. This evolution will be briefly addressed to understand 
how EU has come to this project in Turkey (chapter 1). 
The states’ practice worldwide shows that the deprivation of liberty is generally considered 
as the only way to achieve removal, as the risk of absconding under any other measure 
would be high. The project acknowledges itself that “in terms of implementing the 
readmission agreements removal centers can play an important role”. So, the centers will 
be a tool in the process of removal  
under readmission agreements. Apprehending the nature and the scope of the readmission 
agreements will allow us to understand that the perspective of removal, which is the final 
purpose of the deprivation of liberty in the centers, is not as guaranteed as the right of state 
to expel would let presuppose (chapter 2). 
“Pending deportation procedures, illegal migrants will be controlled under better 
humanitarian conditions”. Those removal centers aim at reaching the international 
standards threshold on detention of irregular migrants (chapter 3). 
Having in mind all those elements, it will be easier to assess whether or not EU could be 
considered liable for any violation of rights in the removal centers it will have financed 
(chapter 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Normative sources will be used to draw the legal framework of the project. General 
International Law will be referred to in order to understand the place of migration in this 
subject matter. In addition, papers on the issue will be used to follow the trends and path it 
is nowadays following. Reports from international organizations will be as well useful to 
highlight the existing or potential violations of rights of migrants or to describe the 
migration challenges facing by Turkey. Finally, the two bodies which have developed 
important decisions on migration detention, and to which EU Member States and Turkey 
are parties, the HRC and the EctHR, will be key tools to underpin international standards 
on migration detention. As the project will be implementing EU “best practices” on 
detention, their legal framework will be adressed through EU Law, notably through the 
Council Directives.  
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CHAPTER 1  MIGRATION AND THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
3.1 Section 1 Migration, a transboundary issue in the reserved domain of states 
 
It is a “matter of well established international law and subject to its territory obligations, 
[that] a state has the right to control entry of non nationals into its territory”. This maxim 
has been reiterated in numerous judgments, opinions of monitoring bodies, states and by 
some international organizations. 
This right is perceived as a consequence of the absolute authority of states over the 
elements constituting it: territory and population
3
. 
Territory is crucial both to the existence of the state and to the determination of the 
boundaries within which it can exercise its jurisdiction.
4
 And boundaries separate the 
population which falls under this jurisdiction from those who do not, the aliens. Boundaries 
have been an obsession for centuries. It was the source of conflict between nations who 
were holding a territory as a part of their identity and a conflict between existing states and 
aspiring states for which statehood was conditional upon the control over a territory.  
Dora Kostakopoulou has shown how from a conception closed to private property law of 
nationalism, aliens were excluded from the memberships of states: “Ownership and 
sovereignty over a land are conceptually linked. It is this link between political authority 
                                                 
3
 CHETAIL , 2007 p24  
4
CASSESE, 2005 p82  
 8 
and collective ownership of the lands that explains why exclusiveness seems to be logically 
entailed by the concept of territorial sovereignty”5. 
It has been showed that the control of borders did not appear as a direct and simultaneous 
consequence of the territorial sovereignty of states
6
; from the beginning of the twentieth 
century it nevertheless led to consider migration as a “reserved domain”  where states were 
not bound by international law
7
. However, it has been acknowledged that reserved domains 
are not fixed and are dependent on the evolution of international law
8
. It must be assessed 
to which extent international law influences and regulates migration issues nowadays.  
First, the powers of states to refuse entry and expel are not absolute, states have to grant 
protection to asylum seekers falling under the conditions of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and have to ensure some guarantees under human rights law to the expellees.  
In addition, different international actors clearly consider the question of migration in a 
deeper way than in the past. At the end of the nineties, the issue started to be regularly on 
the UN agenda, the IOM projects and missions have increased and the Berne initiative in 
2004 gave the opportunity to states to exchange on their different opinions and migration 
policies. 
EU is often showed as an example of abandon of sovereignty over migration in its quest to 
a common asylum and migration policies. But this has happened through an important 
integration process of its member states - this evolution is not likely to occur at a global 
level - and if states are ready to sign inter states agreements, the only convention directly 
dealing with the treatment of migrants has know a disappointing success. The UN 
Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families has been ratified by 
forty four states and signed by fifteen others which are, for most, countries of origin or 
                                                 
5
 KOSTAKOPOULOU, 2004 p41 
6
 Ibid 3, p24-25  Vattel clearly stated in the eighteenth century that people were free to move in Europe as 
long as they were not identified as enemies of the state 
7
 BROWNLIE, 2008, p292 
8
 Ibid 
 9 
transit of migrants. The GCIM
9
 has identified three reasons for this failure. First, some 
states regarding the quasi absence of migration do not feel concerned. Second, human 
rights instruments already guarantee fundamental rights for migrants. Finally, the question 
of sovereignty is raised to argue that the convention would hinder the ability of states to 
control movements of migrants
10
. It seems that states keep on refusing to enter into any 
binding treaty specifically dealing with the treatment of migrants. They are ready to sign 
agreements which are in their interests, dealing with the control of migration flows or  the 
fight against illegal migration for instance. But, they consider human rights law as 
sufficiently encompassing the treatment of migrants; any further treaty specific to the issue 
is seen as an open door to further agreements on how states must regulate entry and stay of 
foreigners. Though initiatives have been taken to identify gaps in international law and the 
international instruments relevant to migration, the issue seems to be stuck in the 
perspective of a state to state relation. 
The globalization has clearly played a role in the evolution of the nature and the perception 
of migration; nevertheless it seems that this evolution has not reached the point where 
states would agree to abandon a part of their sovereignty. This is probably because the 
control of entry and stay of aliens on the territory is still perceived as an element and a 
proof of states’ authority, showing that they have controlled over the elements legitimating 
their existence, territory and population.  
So, it is now acknowledged that some of the challenges migration triggers cannot be solved 
within the territory of each state but states still have full sovereignty in deciding who can 
entry and stay on their territories. Once they have set such rules the treatment of migrants 
must meet the requirements of human rights law. It is generally recognized that migration 
must be approached through existing Human Rights Law, as the international community 
does not seem to move towards a bill or right for Migrants for the reasons cited above
11
. 
                                                 
9
 The Global Commission on International Migration was launched in 2003 and closed in 2005 by the UN 
Security Council. This commission was mandated to provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, 
comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration.  
10
 Martin, 2005 
11
 ALEINIKOFF, 2007,  p 477-479 
 10 
As previously held, EU has been working towards a common asylum and migration policy. 
It has as well become the leader in the development of the external dimension of migration 
policies by enhancing it relations and negotiations on this issue with third countries. 
 
 
3.1 Section 2 EU and the external dimension of migration 
 
This part seeks to give an overview of the externalization process to have a full picture of 
the new dimension of EU migration policies in which the creation of the removal centers in 
Turkey is enshrined. Some issues directly linked to the removal centers are briefly cited 
here and will be further developed in the next chapter. 
 
In 1999 at Tampere EU officially decided to extend the migration issue to its external 
policies, third countries would become “partners” in the fight against illegal migration and 
all the crimes linked to it
12
. 
 
The externalization takes place in three different manners. First, readmission agreements 
are a key instrument.  
Through those agreements, which are bilateral or directly signed with the Union(it has the 
power to do so thanks to the Amsterdam treaty), third countries are committed to take back 
their own nationals and, provided always, third country nationals who have transited on 
their territories. It is worth noted that signing those agreements had been sometimes 
difficult as they are solely in the interest of the Community. 
  
Second other agreements, signed to work on the root causes of migration by promoting 
development, are actually conditioned upon clauses on migration. Indeed, EU has been 
                                                 
12
 Tampere 
 11 
working towards a policy including both the area of migration and development though the 
link between the two is still controversial
13
.  
 
Third, EU is externalizing its traditional instruments through financial and technical  
Support to third countries. This externalization is more or less strong according to the 
concerned countries. States wishing to become members of EU (Turkey for example) 
integrate EU laws and policies in their own (“policy transfer”). This integration is quite 
expensive and those countries have beneficiated from bilateral agreements and from the EU 
help (see for example the EU CARDS programme
14
). Some other countries, situated in 
North Africa or Eastern Europe, have also taken part in other programs of EU through the 
European Neighborhood Policy
15
. Actually, no region of origin of migrants has been 
forgotten. Even African Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) through the Cotonou 
Agreement
16
 are involved in the question of migration towards EU.   
 
The policies on visa, the fight against human trafficking and smuggling and border control 
have as well an externalized character
17
.  
 
To come to all those externalizing agreements, EU has been negotiating in different 
manners according to the third countries in presence and the terms it wanted to obtain. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Verhaeghe 
14
 CARDS, 2000-2006 
15
 REGULATION (EC) No 1638/2006, article 2(r) 
16
 Cotonou Agreement, article 13 on migration and Eurostep’s article on the difficult negotiation of this 
article 
17
 FRONTEX, for instance, is a European agency specialized in border control. It is cooperating with third 
countries in the fight against illegal migration. See FRONTEX website. 
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3.1 Section 3 From negotiating to interfering – the incentives used by EU in its 
negotiations with third countries 
 
By looking at the different agreements with third countries, it can be drawn two patterns 
used by EU to obtain the consent and co-operation of those countries: positive and negative 
incentives
18
. 
Positive incentives usually take the form of agreements on visa facilitation. Their 
negotiations are often parallel to the signature of a readmission agreement. For the other 
state party to the agreement, choosing to sign is choosing to deal with the irregular 
migration “burden”, often previously neglected, for the benefit of its travelling nationals. 
 
EU has key tools to come to sign agreements on trade such as the access to the largest 
common market. But it does not have enough weight when it concerns the readmission of 
irregular migrants. It would seem that both EU and third countries take advantage in 
negotiating such agreements. But their cost must be assessed for both parties. EU engages 
to facilitate the procedure and the requirements for the granting of visa for a limited 
category of nationals of the third country
19
. It cannot afford to grant extensive visa 
facilitation, as this is a matter which usually falls within the domestic prerogatives of the 
member states. For their part, third countries will have to accept the readmission of their 
nationals and third country nationals who have transited through their territories, which as 
we will see further will entail an important investment in the receiving countries in their 
migration policies, administrations and relations with the countries of origin. Readmission 
agreements do not favor the other party to the agreement. For this reason, positive terms are 
sometimes held as “compensation”20 to repair the loss of third states or simply to “pay” the 
service. 
 
                                                 
18
 Vocabulary used  by ROIG, 2007 p 375 
19
 for example the EU-Georgia Agreement on the Facilitation of the Issuance of Visa, 2010 
20
 ROIG, 2007 p 376  
 13 
The nature of negative incentives is much more ambiguous. Though the idea seems to have 
been given up by EU, on time to time some member states call the Union to use such tools 
in its negotiations with third countries. The obvious example of such incentives was first 
seen in the Presidency Conclusions of Seville in 2002. According to the conclusions when 
is identified an  ”unjustified lack of cooperation in the joint management of migration 
flows  […] the Council may […] adopt measures or positions under the common foreign 
and security policy and other EU policies, while honoring the Union’s contractual 
commitments but not jeopardizing development cooperation objectives”21. 
In any case EU would breach its obligations under its agreements.  
Nevertheless the absence of cooperation from the third country would lead to the 
readjustment of the EU allocations in the field of development for example. In addition 
“insufficient cooperation [would] hamper [the] establishment of closer relations”22, the 
third country could lose opportunities of negotiations and further agreements in any other 
field.  
Those negative incentives clearly not aim at “attracting” the consent of the states but to 
coerce it to fulfill its obligations of cooperation under an agreement or enter into one.    
 
Some states such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (referred as ACP) would be 
vulnerable to such negative incentives, notably when their stability is dependent on EU 
development allocations. It could be argued in this case that EU would pressurize so much 
third countries through those incentives that they would not have any other choice than 
entering into co operation agreements and readjusting their migration policies to the EU 
will. It would “force a state something that is contrary to its will” 23 and consequently could 
amount to intervention.  
 
                                                 
21
Presidency Conclusions 13463/02, 2002 para 36 
22
 Ibid para 35 
23
 SEMB, 1992  
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The principle of non intervention in the affairs of other states is “designed to ensure that 
each state respects the fundamental prerogatives of the other members of the 
community”24. It expresses the sovereign equality of states.  
 
This principle is usually referred to in matters in which the jurisdiction of states is 
considered absolute as migration. Those matters are in the “reserved domain”25.  
But this principle is not absolute
26
 and the borderline with the interstate pressure games is 
sometimes not easy to draw. Economic measures, such as the cutting of development 
allocations, can amount to intervention under some conditions.  Cassese argues that: 
 
the decision simply to withhold economic assistance to developing countries or to 
stop the financing of international institutions promoting development, does not 
amount to an infringement of the principle, if such decision is warranted by serious 
difficulties on the part of the granting state or by a change in its policy that is 
motivated exclusively by domestic considerations 
27
 
 
In the case of EU, it is difficult to see how it would justify such withhold by any serious 
difficulties or domestic considerations directly linked to the question of development. So, 
the use of such incentives would clearly not be justified and by coercing a state to enter into 
co-operation and foster its migration policies to take path wanted by EU could amount to 
intervention. But it should be taken into account that several forms of intervention have 
been considered as legitimate. Would interference in the domestic affairs of the state 
concerning migration be a legitimate exception to the principle of non intervention? 
 
                                                 
24
 CASSESE, 2007 p 53  
25
 BROWNLIE, 2008 p 292 
26
 The most discussed of its exception is probably the humanitarian intervention considered as the most 
critical  
27
 CASSESE, 2007  p 54-55  
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“Political Conditionality” has been often used in the case of interference in the internal 
affairs of a state for the respect of Human Rights and progress towards democracy. In this 
case it refers to the allocations of aid to encourage the political reforms and though 
considered as inconsistent with the principle of non intervention, its efficiency was the 
topic of numerous discussions rather than its legitimacy
28
.  This type of intervention is 
justified by values which are considered in the interest of the population, the state “victim 
of” intervention and the whole community.  
 
In the state of international migration, where destination states as EU member states appear 
to face growing migration flows and the first and only ones concerned by the question, it is 
clear that such intervention would never be seen as justified by the interest of third state, 
country of origin or transit. But it can be argued that it would be in the interest of the whole 
community to oblige states to regulate migration: it could lead to the decrease of the crimes 
linked or perceived as linked to it such as trafficking, smuggling or even terrorism.  
 
To sum up, intervention is less likely to be considered as legitimate for three reasons. First, 
migration is still considered by the majority of the international community as falling under 
the reserved domain of states. Second, EU would only have the weight to intervene in 
countries which are highly dependent of its allocations, countries which would not 
necessarily represent the main countries of origin or transit of irregular migrants. 
Finally, regulating it and “combating” irregular migration is still perceived as being only in 
the interest of the destination states which is a bar to the legitimization of intervention in 
this domain. Clearly, negative incentives do not appear as the best solutions to find a way 
in the impasse in which EU finds itself in agreements related to migration.  
 
Turkey is still negotiating readmission agreement with EU. The Union is using positive 
incentives to obtain its consent on some issues such as the readmission of irregular third 
country nationals. But contrary to states which are not ready to embrace EU migration 
                                                 
28
 WALLER,1995  p 110 
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policies, Turkey, an endless candidate to the Union, has undertaken deep changes to be in 
accordance with EU standards by adopting the acquis communautaires. Those acquis are 
nevertheless perceived as putting Turkey under pressure “as to bend to EU interests”29.  
 
3.1 Section 4 From influence to Europeanization – Policy transfer, the case of 
Turkey  
 
Ukraine, Libya and Turkey are acknowledged to be the countries the most influenced by 
EU policies. Human Rights Watch has declared that the “pressure” of EU pushed Libya to 
abandon its “previous open door policy for foreigners” and Ukraine to adopt the most 
critical aspects of EU migration policies
30
. In a paper on neighboring countries, 
CLANDESTINO, it was stated that “the National experts’ reports compared here agree that 
the EU has decisive influence on the Countries policy making and outcomes” referring to 
Turkey
31
. 
This decisive influence takes the form of policy transfer. The most advanced transfer is 
referred in the literature as “Europeanization” of third country policies. 
 
The Europeanization is a far more advanced process than the externalization though it can 
be considered as one of the form it can take.  
 Europeanization can be defined as any “processes of construction, diffusion, and 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
“ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms to a European model of governance, 
caused by forms of cooperation and integration in Europe” 32. 
 Those processes presuppose an EU membership conditionality
33
.  
                                                 
29
Kaya, 2007 p  24  
30
 Human Rights Watch, 2006 
31
 Kaya, 2007 p 24 
32
ICDUYGUIN, 2004 p 202 
33
Accession Partnership of Turkey  
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As a potential member, in 2003, Turkey launched a National Programme on the adoption of 
EU acquis communautaires, the “National Action Plan”. It intended to initiate the 
harmonization in both asylum and migration field.  
This action plan is a clear example of “Europeanization” of Turkish policies and legal 
instruments. In 2008, when the Accession Partnership of Turkey was rediscussed by the 
Council
34
, the adoption and implementation of the acquis “best practices on migration with 
a view to preventing illegal migration” was set up as a medium term priority while as a 
short term priority it was reminded that Turkey must “increase [its] capacity to combat 
illegal migration in line with international standards”.  
 
Turkey is both a country of immigration and emigration. However, it is only since the 
nineties that it has seen flows of foreigners coming, and a growth of the number of irregular 
migrants. Three categories of irregular migrants can be nowadays identify in Turkey: -
(1)those who came to work and whom the visa have expired –(2)those who transit, with an 
illegal entry and departure to EU –(3)and rejected asylum seekers who stay illegally.  
 In its relation to EU it is of course Turkey as a country of transit which is the main focus; 
in fact transit migrants have been identified as being the most important group out of those 
three
35
. In addition, it has become a de facto country of refugees despite the geographical 
limitation of the 1951 Convention it applies. 
 
By adopting the EU acquis communautaires, Turkey agreed to withdraw this geographical 
limitation by 2012. From this date, it will have to process the claims of asylum seekers 
coming from non European countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan - who were 
previously resettled with the help of the UNHCR in other countries when recognized as 
refugees - which are among the most important groups seeking protection transiting via 
Turkey to Europe
36
. 
                                                 
34
 COUNCIL DECISION 2008/157/EC 
35
 ibid 
36
 IOM, 2003 p 18 
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In addition EU member states, if they wish so, will be able to go further in the negotiations 
with Turkey by signing readmission agreements of asylum seekers based on the safe third 
country rule
37
.  Upon, its accession to EU, it is anyway certain that the Dublin Regulation 
will be applicable to Turkey which will decrease the number of claims in EU significantly 
for some groups of asylum seekers
38
.   
 
This shift in migration policy has an important cost. EU has consequently adopted a 
“burden sharing” approach by which it agrees to participate in the financing of such 
changes in solidarity with Turkey. The Union is, for instance, financing twinning projects. 
 
Those instruments of pre accession assistance usually involve one or several member states 
in assisting Turkey in its alignment with EU standards (in transportation, environmental 
fields for example) and are financially supported by EU through the pre accession 
programme. 
 
The twinning project on “support to Turkey’s capacity in combating illegal migration and 
establishment of removal centers for illegal migrants” came into begin in 2007 and aimed 
at building and running the facilities by 2012.  
Turkey will have for the first time center dedicated to the removal of irregular migrants.  
Financial support, building capacities, training of staff are provided through this project. By 
reading its content, it is clear that the creation of those centers was not thought to deal with 
                                                 
37
 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedure, 2010 p 297. The safe third country concept is regulated in EU law 
by the directive on minimum standards on procedures in member states for granting or withdrawing refugee 
status. Recital 23 held that “member states should also not be obliged to assess the substance of an asylum 
application where the applicant, due to a connection to a third country as defined by national law, can 
reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country”. This possibility must be prescribed by 
domestic law and some conditions must be fulfilled to make the sending of an asylum seeker to a third 
country valid. Since it will possible to request the status of refugee in Turkey for any applicant from 2012, 
Member states would be able to negotiate the application of such rule with Turkey providing that other 
conditions are fulfilled.  
38
European Commission, 2004 p 43 
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the new flow of asylum seekers and consequently of rejected asylum seekers that Turkey is 
going to face with the end of the geographical limitation of the Refugee Convention. 
It was more thought for the achievement of “a better capacity to cope with illegal 
migration” in general. 
 
In addition, those removal centers aim at facilitating the implementation of readmission 
agreements. The EU acquis and best practices on detention will be applied in those centers 
in order to ensure a better humanitarian situation for irregular migrants. It intends to be a 
positive progress for Turkey which is often pointed out for human rights violations in the 
field of migration. 
 
Indeed, in 2008 the EU Progress Report of Turkey, assessing the progress in borders tasks 
and the readmission agreement concluded that there had been “little progress” on 
management of irregular migrants in Turkey, pointing out that it was still not possible to 
submit detention and removal decisions to a senior administrative and to a judicial review. 
In addition, the material conditions of detention were still considered insufficient and the 
absence of limitation of the length of detention was as well mentioned as lacking
39
. All 
those elements do not fulfill the obligations of Turkey under International Law though 
important changes seem to be ongoing on this question
40
.  In 2007, the organization HCA 
published a report on the situation of asylum seekers in detention and through interviews 
with detained refugees drawn up a state of “foreigners’ guesthouses” in Turkey which was 
highlighting the same elements
41
.  
 
The removal centers would possibly welcome three different categories of irregular 
migrants: 
Irregular migrants “caught” in Turkey - failed asylum seekers - irregular migrants 
readmitted in Turkey under the EC/Turkey readmission agreement. 
                                                 
39
 Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p 71 
40
 See chapter 3, section 4 of this thesis “Migration detention in Turkey” 
41
 Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 2007 
 20 
All of them would be detained under a removal procedure in order to be sent back in their 
country of origin or a country of transit when possible. The removal procedures could be 
facilitated by further readmission agreements between Turkey and the countries of origin or 
transit. 
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CHAPTER 2 READMISSION AGREEMENTS AND THE PERSPECTIVE OF REMOVAL2 
 
Expulsion, deportation, removal, return… all those words usually refer to the transfer of a 
third country national to its country of nationality
42
 when his stay has been identified as 
illegal.  
Under international law, states have a wide margin of appreciation on the expulsion of 
aliens due to its sovereign right over its territory. Nevertheless it is commonly 
acknowledged that states authorities must take into account the interest of the person 
expelled by considering the consequences of the expulsion on his fundamental rights
43
.  
 
Readmission is an administrative process between two states on “transfer” and admission 
of illegally staying third country nationals and failed asylum seekers. Readmission 
agreements are part of an efficient return policy by which third country nationals 
voluntarily return or upon whom a removal procedure is. 
This readmission can take the form of an agreement dealing specifically with it or of a 
clause included in broader agreement dealing for example with development
44
.  
Since the Amsterdam treaty the EC has the legal power to conclude such agreements
45
. To 
date, it has eleven agreements and seven under negotiations. It can as well be signed 
directly between a member state and a third country. By the end of this year, the 
                                                 
42
 In some countries, such as Australia, deportation is the transfer of individuals to protect the national 
security or because of the commission of specific offences while removal refers to the migration act of 
transferring an irregular non citizen.  
43
 Goodwin-Gill, 1978 general 
44
 Those clauses are mandatory in all agreements signed between the European Community, its member states 
and third countries in accordance with the Council decision of 2th December 1999 which was not published 
in the Official Journal 
45
 See article 79(3) TFEU and article 218 TFEU 
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readmission agreements already implemented should have been the object of an assessment 
report.  
Readmission agreements repeal the right of state to expel aliens from its territory and set a 
framework of conditions for the validity of the transfer and alleviate all the administrative 
requirements previously necessary, such as the issuing of a consular laissez passer.  
 
 
2.1 Section 1 States’ obligations under a readmission agreement  
 
In law, a right presupposes a corresponding obligation though this is not always the case
46
.  
If a state has a right to expel, it entails an obligation for another to receive the expellee. 
Consequently it is generally accepted that states have an obligation to take back their own 
citizens. This obligation is often justified by article 13 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country “. 
Indeed if a state has to readmit its citizens who return by their own will, they have as well 
to do so when it is the consequence of the sovereign right of another state to expel aliens 
who have breached its immigration laws. It should be reminded that this breach does not 
give a punitive character to the expulsion.  
It could be argued that, as right to expel and obligation to receive are customary rules, 
readmission agreements are only a useless repetition of a practice accepted as law. Indeed, 
the practice of expulsion is not new and since the 60’s its procedure has been materialized 
by readmission agreements
47
.  
But, those agreements are merely considered necessary to tackle the lack of cooperation of 
countries of origin or transit and aim at facilitating the procedure. They are as well 
indispensable when the readmission concerns third country nationals or stateless persons 
who have transited through the receiving country as no international instrument lays down 
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any obligation to readmit them
48
. The EctHR has actually stated that the removal of a third 
country national to a country which is not his or her country of origin is carried out without 
proper legal procedure when no readmission agreement has been signed between the two 
countries
49
.  
Actually, third countries have always been called for cooperation in the procedure of 
return. They have been asked to facilitate the transit in their territory of irregular migrants 
upon whom removal was carried on
50
 regardless of whether or not the person had transited 
through their territory. Nowadays third countries are asked to take back third country 
nationals who have transited on their way to the country of destination. They will have the 
responsibility to carry on further return procedure to the country of origin when possible.  
The principles of « good neighborliness » would justify such responsibility in that transit 
countries must readmit third country nationals if they « supported or tolerated the illegal 
migration of nationals of third states in a reproachable manner »
51
. 
 
As said previously, those readmission agreements repeal the right of sates to expel aliens 
but not their obligations under international law concerning deportation. It simply reminds 
that they shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and responsibilities arising 
from conventions and other agreements relevant to the issue of readmission.  But, one  
obligation must be reminded here: the principle of non refoulement. This principle 
prohibits the return or extradition of a person to another state where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he or she would face the risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 3 ECHR rebels this principle of 
customary law
52
. Though the 1951 Refugee Convention limits its applicability, the 
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dispositions of those three conventions apply to every person. The principle of non 
refoulement is absolute.  
Consequently, states have an obligation not to deport when the person is facing a real risk 
of being subjected to treatment contrary to those articles
53
 and according to the EctHR the 
removal to an intermediate country does not prevent the state deporting to fulfill its 
obligation under article 3 regarding the consequences of a subsequent removal (“chain of 
events”)54 . 
It must be assessed before removing someone to a transit country that it will not send the 
expellee to a place where he could face ill treatment. This risk  must be foreseeable for the 
removing state.  
So, the state must foresee two elements: (first) that the expellee will be the object of a 
subsequent removal – by a deportation order previously issued by the receiving state55 or 
from the general practice of subsequently removing - to a state where (second) there is a 
real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR.   
 
Readmission agreements do not prevent states to assess on a case by case basis the 
consequence of the removal.  They do not presuppose that the receiving states will fulfill, 
in addition to its obligation under the agreement, its obligations under international law.  
 
 
2.2 Section 2 Perspective of removal – Readmission agreements between 
Turkey and countries of origin or transit  
 
As seen before readmission agreements do not repeal obligations of states under 
international law. Consequently, when no human rights safeguards have been guaranteed 
the cost of those agreements could be high.  Indeed, EC ask third countries to deal with the 
repatriation and/or the temporary stay or permanent residence of irregular migrants. But, it 
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is difficult to expect countries with less means and experience than EC to deal with their 
cases in a manner fully respecting international standards. This is even more critical 
concerning irregular migrants whom transit route are identified but not their nationalities
56
 
or those for whom return to the country of origin is impossible for any reason. There is a 
high risk in this case that those migrants will be indefinitely locked or left to traffickers. 
This question is so problematic that EC should exclude non nationals in readmission 
agreements “to appease Human rights and international concerns” according to some 
commentators
57
 . 
EU has been, with difficulty,  negotiating a readmission agreement with Turkey including 
third country nationals. The negotiations have nevertheless known a “substantial progress” 
recently
58
. 
And, to ensure that third country nationals will be sent back to their countries of origin - 
regardless of whether or not they have been previously sent back from Europe to Turkey -   
Turkey has already signed readmission agreements with Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Romania and 
Ukraine. Negotiations are ongoing with Pakistan according to the Turkish Ministry of 
foreign affairs
59
. It seems that Turkey is as well negotiating with Lebanon, Russia, 
Bulgaria, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Uzbekistan and Libya
60
. It proposed a readmission agreement 
to Afghanistan in 2008
61
. In addition, discussions are in process with Lebanon, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Georgia, Moldova and 
Uzbekistan
62
. 
                                                 
56
 It might be difficult for the receiving country itself to find the nationality of the expellee. But it seems that 
the nationality of the irregular migrant must be identified before being sent to the transit country see 
Readmission agreement EC-Pakistan,   
Article 5(1) b:”Readmission application must contain: indication for the means for the proof of nationality, 
transit…”  
article 4(3):”No one should be readmitted only on the basis of prima facie evidence of nationality”  
57
ROIG, 2007 p 382  
58
 Conclusions on Turkey, European Commission, 2010 [p 7]  
59
 Republic of Turkey Ministry of foreign affairs’ website  
60
 Justice, Freedom and Security: Enlargement, Evaluation on Turkey  
61
 Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p 71-72  
62
 Turkey 2010 Progress Report, p 82 
 26 
In addition, according to an independent Turkish journalist, Turkey is asking EU to 
negotiate readmission agreements and to include a “Turkish clause”, to facilitate the last 
return procedure from Turkey
63
. EU has probably more incentives to offer in negotiations 
than Turkey, but it would take the risk of being associated with any deplorable 
consequences of a removal by Turkey with such clause.  
 
Signing readmission agreements with third countries is for sure in the interest of Turkey, to 
ensure the fulfillment of EU requirements in the fight against illegal migration; though by 
looking at the effectiveness of the readmission agreement signed with Greece, it should be 
added that such agreements would only work if both countries party to the agreement fulfill 
their obligations and can ensure respect for the human rights of migrants.  
Indeed in 2002, the readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey entered into force. 
But this agreement did not trigger many official readmissions
64
, as illegal deportation by 
Greece authorities to Turkey seems to be the rule. This practice has serious consequences 
on the right to seek asylum. Cases are often not processed by Greece before being sent back 
to Turkey
65
. 
This issue of refoulement of asylum seekers who consequently do not have access to a 
proper claim procedure and are the victim of chain refoulement may not rise under EC-
Turkish agreement as it will only concern irregular migrants and failed asylum seekers. As 
the Commission has precised concerning the agreement between Pakistan and EC: “EU law 
requires Member States to ensure that third country nationals present on the territory of the 
Member States may apply for international protection if they so wish and that in particular 
the Treaty, the Asylum Qualification and the Return Directive make it clear that Member 
States must respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international 
obligations. The Commission also recalls that EU Member States are in particular obliged 
to ensure, in all cases, that no return is effected in violation of the European Human Rights 
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Convention and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which oblige States to ensure that a 
person should not be returned if he or she would be likely to suffer serious harm on his or 
her return to a country of origin or transit.”66 
The last statement has a quite important echo in the case of Turkey which has been 
condemned by the EctHR for the absence of guarantees in detention and pointed out 
concerning the conditions of detention which amounted to a violation of article 3 ECHR 
according to the European Court
67
.  
To sum up, following EU standards, Turkey will have first to make certain that readmitted 
irregular migrants will be treated in accordance with human rights law notably concerning 
their detention pending a further removal to their countries of origin or transit. Second, it 
will have to make sure that asylum seekers will have had access to a proper asylum claim 
before being removed from its territory. 
In addition, it will have to ensure that the removals will be in accordance with the principle 
of non refoulement (article 3 ECHR) and will be carried out in respect of human rights 
standards on expulsion. It will have to assess whether or not the person will face a risk of 
being the victim of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR in the receiving state, but as well 
in a state in which this person might be subsequently deported when Turkey removed him 
or her in a transit country. 
The list of countries with which Turkey is negotiating or has signed agreements is not 
without concerns. Some of them have not signed the relevant human rights treaties and are 
well known for their recurrent violations of human rights
68
. Some others could be 
considered at some point as being in a general situation of violence. The EctHR has held 
that such general situation of violence does not normally in itself entail a violation of article 
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3
69
. In order to determine whether or not there is a risk of ill treatment the personal 
circumstances and the general situation must be taken into account. But it has as well 
recently stated that  
the court has never excluded the possibility that a general situation of violence in a 
country of destination will be of sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any 
removal to it would necessarily breach article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, 
the Court would adopt such approach only in the most extreme cases of general 
violence, where there was a real risk of ill treatment simply by virtue of an 
individual being exposed to such violence on return
70
 
Turkey will have to assess the situation of the receiving countries for each individual case, 
despite the readmission agreements, to avoid breaching any of its obligations under 
international law
71
.  
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CHAPTER 3  DETENTION AND MIGRATION: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Section 1 International and Legal Framework 
3.1.1 First subsection Detention, deprivation of liberty and restriction upon 
liberty of movement 
 
In our societies detention is a serious decision and an exception to the principles guiding 
our democracies
72
. It is the last resort used by states to control and punish individuals who 
have harmed the society in a way or another. It is generally tolerated by the general opinion 
and no more serious punishment is used nowadays in most western countries since death 
penalty has been abolished. 
A “detained person” is defined by the Body of Principles for the protection of all persons 
under any form of detention or imprisonment
73
 as “any person deprived of personal liberty 
except as a result of conviction for an offence”. The body makes a difference between 
“imprisoned person”, who has been convicted for an offence, and “detained person”. It is 
generally acknowledged that irregular migration must not be criminalized. As such 
irregular migrants cannot be convicted for their illegal entrance and can solely be detained. 
Furthermore, in a commentary of the ICCPR, Nowak affirms that detention in its article 9 
refers to “the state of deprivation of liberty”.74 
                                                 
72
 The prohibition of arbitrary detention is an old standing principle see Magna Carta 1215: ”No free man 
shall be taken or imprisoned [...] except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the Lord” 
73
 UN General Assembly, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 1988 
74
 NOWAK, 2005 p 221 para 21 
 30 
The ECHR refers to detention only within its article 5 on the deprivation of liberty
75
 while 
it does not in article 2 protocol 4 on the liberty of movement. 
However, expressions as “restriction on freedom of movement” and “deprivation of 
liberty” are sometimes used confusingly, as both referring to detention. 
For instance, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines detention as a 
“restriction on freedom of movement usually through enforced confinement of an 
individual by governmental authorities”.  
 
This definition is inaccurate in two ways. First, as seen before detention is in no way a 
restriction upon the liberty of movement. Second, it refers to individual in general which 
encompass irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. But, according to article 12 
ICCPR and article 2.1 of the 4
th
 protocol ECHR irregular migrants are excluded from the 
scope of the liberty of movement.
76
  Thus technically and legally speaking irregular 
migrants do not enjoy such right and consequently cannot see it being restricted. 
Nevertheless the EctHR and the HRC have both avoided making such statement. The Court 
and the HRC have both abstain to clearly set who enjoy such right and who does not. 
Indeed when they have to make the difference between the restriction on movement and 
detention, they never based their reasoning on the status of the person. And, this gets round 
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having to determine who enjoys a liberty which stands as a human right which would be a 
controversial exercise. 
 
 The next question is what a deprivation of liberty is. The confusion of expressions 
between restriction of liberty of movement and deprivation of liberty as referring to 
detention is actually the transposition in wordings of a difficulty in drawing the line 
between the two in facts. 
According to the HRC, article 9 can refer to incarceration within a building such as 
immigration detention centre or even one’s home. The fact of being under a compulsory 
residence order for seven years with an obligation to report to the police three times a week 
and a prohibition from travelling freely in the state does not amount to a deprivation of 
liberty according to the Committee
77
. The EctHR held in Guzzardi v. Italy
78
 that the 
difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of 
degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance”. This difference of degree, the 
Court refers to, is more or less similar to the notion of “severity” used by the HRC in that 
they both concern the effects of the measures.  
In front of the EctHR in Guzzardi v. Italy, contrary to the HRC in Celepli v. Sweden, the 
plaintiff was confined to a part of an island and could only move within this area within a 
time limit with prior notification to the authorities. In addition he could not have any 
contact with the inhabitants of the island except those who were under the same measure 
than him. Though at first the measures in the two cases seem similar, as being described by 
the authorities as compulsory residence, it is clear that the degree of severity of the measure 
in the case in front of the ECHR in Guzzardi v. Italy is higher.  
Contrary to cases involving mentally ill or disabled individuals where the deprivation of 
liberty is undertaken by psychiatric facilities and not state authorities, the Court does not 
refer directly to “the complete and effective control over care and movement” of the 
authorities to determine if the person is under a deprivation of liberty
79
. Nevertheless it 
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takes into account the degree to which the person has to report his movement to the 
authorities which leads more or less to the same assessment. If there is no need to get an 
authorization, being under “special police supervision” does not amount to a deprivation of 
liberty
80
 for instance.  
 
To draw the difference between the deprivation of liberty and the restriction on liberty of 
movement, the EctHR has given more precised elements of assessment than the HRC. 
Indeed in the above cited case and Engel and others v. The Netherlands
81
, the Court held 
that through criteria such as type, effects, duration and manner of implementation of the 
measure the concrete situation of the person must be assessed to determine if there is a 
deprivation of liberty. 
This is done in a case by case assessment. For instance, the fact that a person can leave the 
country in which he is held for twenty days in an international zone at the airport does not 
mean that this person is not deprived of his liberty
82
. The confinement in a hotel for ten 
days amounts to a deprivation of liberty
83
. 
It is for this reason clear that it is difficult, not to say impossible, to list elements common 
to any deprivation of liberty such as a precise length of time or the place where the 
deprivation is undertaken. 
  
 
The last element on which states tend to agree is that the detention of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers is not criminal but administrative, as illegal entry must not be 
criminalized. Nevertheless, some states make effort to take such steps, as denounced by the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
84
. As an administrative measure, their deprivation 
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of liberty can be referred as “custody”. In 1999, the WGAD started using such terminology 
in a report regarding the situation of immigrants and asylum seekers
85
.  
Some states, like France, tend to curve the reality by referring to the detention of irregular 
migrants with softer words as “retention administrative” (irregular migrants are not 
“détenus” but “retenus”)86. The removal centers built by the project will be “accomodating” 
irregular migrants. 
Whatever the word used to describe the situation of irregular migrants and asylum seekers 
detained, they are deprived of their liberty whatever the kind of detention they are under. 
 
 
 Once it is clear that detention must be understood as a deprivation of liberty and 
that a deprivation of liberty can take other form than a detention in a center, it must be 
determined who can be under this deprivation and in which circumstances. The asylum 
seeker must be distinguished from the failed asylum seeker and the irregular migrant whom 
stay on the territory is or has become illegal.  
The detention of asylum seekers is here discussed briefly to underline the differences of 
right and perception between this group and those denied protection and irregular migrants.  
 
3.1.2 Second subsection Loose prohibition of detention of asylum seekers  
 
Asylum seekers are considered more vulnerable than irregular migrants. Their flight has 
been forced because of the persecution they may have been the victim of.   
They flee to seek protection from another state. As detention is seen as a mean to punish, it 
seems obvious that the will of asylum seekers to reach a secured place should not be 
condemned by detaining them.  
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Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prohibits the penalization of the illegal entry of 
asylum seekers. Their entry cannot be considered unlawful. For this reason they, in 
principle, do not fall under the cases of deprivation of liberty listed by the article 5 ECHR. 
The UNHCR conclusion 44 clearly set that the detention of asylum seekers should be 
normally avoided
87
. They should be able to fully enjoy their right to liberty. 
Some important exceptions have been drawn by the UNHCR. Asylum seekers can be 
detained “to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim to refugee status 
or asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed 
their travel and/or identity documents or have used fraudulent documents in order to 
mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to protect 
national security or public order”88. 
 
Those exceptions are quite broad and non precise. In addition nothing in the international 
instruments determines the length of detention. But at least contrary to some regional 
instrument, the exceptions are set.  
 
Indeed, in EU law the detention of asylum seekers is permissible as long as it is justified by 
other reason than the mere fact of having claimed asylum
89
 which leaves a wide range of 
manoeuvre for member states. 
It is as well worth noted that when EU law defines detention, it refers to a deprivation of 
freedom of movement
90
, confusion which is often found as previously stated. 
Actually even the UNHCR defines detention of asylum seekers as “confinement […] where 
freedom of movement if substantially curtailed, and where the only opportunity to leave 
this limited area is to leave the territory”91. 
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This highlights how much the issue is controversial and lead to ambiguous definitions and 
legal texts. The detention in itself of asylum seekers is constantly challenged by 
international organizations and monitoring bodies nevertheless states keep on using it 
abusively.  
 
The Refugee Convention is silent on the treatment of asylum seekers whom claims have 
been rejected.  
In EU law, recital 9 of the return directive holds that “[…] a third country national who has 
applied for asylum in a member state should not be regarded as staying illegally on the 
territory of that Member state until a negative decision on the application, or a decision 
ending his or her right of stay as asylum seeker has entered into force”92. Their entry in the 
territory of the state processing their cases is considered illegal one they have received a 
negative answer. 
Consequently, they must leave the territory of the state and are entitled to the same 
treatment than irregular migrants. They have the choice between forced removal and when 
available voluntary return with the assistance of IOM in most cases.  
Though there is a clear absence of instrument specific to the treatment of rejected asylum 
seekers, human rights law and other standards on expulsion are obviously applicable.  
As irregular migrants, failed asylum seekers are usually detained pending removal to avoid 
the risk of absconding. The debate concerning the detention of irregular migrants is most of 
the time based on the conditions of detention and not on the use of detention itself. 
 
3.1.3 Third subsection Explicit approbation of immigration detention 
 
“Immigration detention” refers in this part to the detention of failed asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants. This detention takes place at the end of the process of seeking asylum 
and in some countries applies only to those who do not voluntary return.  
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 The right to liberty is protected by article 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The principle 
is simple: “Everyone has the right to liberty”.  
Both articles have exceptions. The ECHR enumerates the cases where exceptions are 
allowed and expressly include the case of irregular migrants
93
. 
The fact that the exception is clearly held in the ECHR shows that nothing in this 
convention is against the deprivation of liberty of illegal immigrants and failed asylum 
seekers who are to be deported, while it was more difficult to categorically say so for the 
ICCPR. 
Several communications of the Human Rights Committee were needed to make 
clear that the deprivation of liberty in migration cases fell under article 9 of the ICCPR
94
.  
By falling under article 5 ECHR and article 9 ICCPR the detention of irregular migrants 
must be lawful and not arbitrary. At first it seems that states would not need any other 
justification than the illegal entry or stay to deprive migrants from their liberty as it is their 
sovereign right to control the entry and stay of aliens. The HRC has challenged states, in 
cases involving asylum seekers, to go further in their justification of the detention than the 
mere fact of having entered the territory unlawfully and this in general wordings. The 
EctHR has not been as far as the HRC and does not require the same “level” of 
justification.   
 
According to the ECHR there is no need for the detention to be the last resort as 
long as there is a fair balance between the purpose of the detention and the right to liberty
95
 
whereas the HRC has urged states to justify the detention.  
According to the HRC, the illegal entrance and stay is not sufficient to consider a 
detention fair, other grounds particular to the individual must justify the use of detention 
such as the « likelihood to abscond » and the « lack of cooperation ». As we are not in 
cases involving criminal offences it seems that the authorities should prove by 
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preponderance of evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt that such risk exists. Proof 
of past escape seems to be the most obvious proof, when it comes to lack of cooperation, 
the absence of will to answer interviews or the destructions of identity papers seem to be 
the more relevant. In fact, the Committee has never given examples of elements which 
could be considered as relevant and sufficient to show the existence of a risk to abscond. In 
addition the authorities must show that no other means than detention was available to 
obtain the same result
96
.  
But the EctHR does not go as far as the Committee and does not require any other 
justification than the carrying out of removal to detain: « all that is required under this 
provision [article 5.1(f) ECHR] is that action has been taken with a view to deportation »
97
.  
Though no change might occur at the level of the ECHR we may see an evolution in EU 
states’ practice thanks to a European directive and the ECJ, though it was recently 
denounced that the use of detention was in growth in EU states
98
. Indeed, the EU return 
directive
99
 sets as a principle that the detention for removal may be used « unless other 
sufficient but less coercive measure can be applied effectively in a specific case ». The 
whole article of the directive is actually ambiguous. On one hand, it seems that states must 
justify the use of alternatives to detention when the use of detention appears to be useless in 
a « specific case ». On the other hand it states that « Member States may only keep in 
detention […] in particular when-(a) there is a risk of absconding or – (b) the third country 
national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process ». 
Certainly  the existence of alternatives to detention is for the first time cited in a binding 
instrument of EU law and this achievement considering the reluctance of member states 
should been seen as a positive step.  Nevertheless, the principle and the exception should be 
made clear: « non coercive measure shall be used unless detention is the only sufficient 
measure in a specific case »
100…  
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It is as well worth noted that the preamble of this directive refers to a proportionality test 
« the use of detention for the purpose of removal should be limited and subject to the 
principle of proportionality with regard to the means used and objective pursued »
101
. It 
implies that if the removal can be carried out without using detention, it is no longer 
justified though there has been illegal entry, stay and action is being taken to deportation. 
 
To conclude, both the committee and the Court have never condemned the immigration 
detention.
102
 
 
3.2 Section 2 Legal standards of detention 
3.2.1 First subsection Prohibition against arbitrary and unlawful detention 
 
Both the HRC and the ECHR have clearly stated that a lawful detention can be arbitrary. 
The two notions have different meanings according to the Court and the Committee.  
 « the notion of arbitrariness » in article 5.1 extends beyond lack of conformity with 
national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but 
still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention »
103
 
 « Arbitrariness is not to be equated with against the law, but must be interpreted 
more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of 
predictability »
104
 
The notion of lawfulness is clearly understood and defined. The detention must be 
prescribed by law. And this is a key element of fairness because it participates in 
predictability.  In this sense an unlawful detention cannot be considered fair. But a lawful 
detention can be considered arbitrary. According to the ECHR to avoid all risk of 
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arbitrariness the law must be of sufficient quality » and « sufficiently accessible and 
precise»
105
.  
So there is one element making a detention lawful at the domestic level: the prescription by 
law. There is a plurality of elements needed to make a detention fair: lawfulness is one of 
them.  
 
Contrary to the ECHR the ICCPR does not list exhaustively the cases where the detention 
is permissible. This is actually the reason why the notion of lawfulness had been added to 
the text
106
. 
 
The law prescribing the detention must not be arbitrary as the manner in which detention is 
carried on. Both the convention and the covenant have opted for a broad interpretation of 
the notion of arbitrariness.  
According to the EctHR the detention must be carried out in good faith and the purpose 
must be to prevent unauthorized entry of the person. As stated earlier the detention does not 
need to be the last resort.  
The HRC has on his part identified elements which can make a detention arbitrary: 
inappropriateness and injustice
107
. The detention must be justified by the illegal entry and 
circumstances particular to the individual.  The HRC refers to a proportionality test in 
which the necessity of the detention in all circumstances of the case must be assessed. 
 
However, the ECHR uses a narrower proportionality test by referring to it concerning the 
length of the detention
108
. It should not be pursued longer than the reasonable time to 
proceed to prosecution. The detention is justified as long as the proceedings are in 
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progress
109
. With the same spirit the HRC held that detention should not continue beyond 
the period for which the state party can provide appropriate justification
110
.  
 
In EU law, the “Return Directive” sets a maximum of 18 months of detention under certain 
conditions
111. In a recent case, the ECJ has precised that “the detention ceases to be 
justified and the person concerned must be released immediately when it appears that, for 
legal or other considerations, a reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists”112. 
The reasonable prospect of removal does not exist “where it appears unlikely that the 
person concerned will be admitted to a third country”113. 
The detention ceases to be justified in two situations: first when it is clear that there is no 
chance for the person to be removed, which can be realized before the end of the maximum 
period; second when the maximum period of detention has elapsed and no removal could 
be carried out. 
The Court added that the fact that a person concerned does not have “valid documents […] 
has no means of supporting himself and no accommodation or means supplied but the 
member state for that purpose”114 cannot prevent his release.  
 
Another element must be taken into account according to the EctHR to make a deprivation 
of liberty fair: the conditions of detention. Indeed, the “place and conditions of the 
detention should be appropriate”115 as the “measure is applicable not to those who have 
committed criminal offence but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from 
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their own country”116. It seems that this last sentence refers to migrants in general as it does 
not refer to any element of persecution. 
Article 10 ICCPR deals with the right of detainees to be treated with humanity and dignity. 
This can explain why the HRC has not explicitly held that the conditions of detention must 
be an element of assessment of the arbitrariness.  
The Working Group on arbitrary detention has set up several guarantees for the assessment 
of the arbitrary character of the detention
117
. Those guarantees do not only concern the 
length of time, the last resort and the condition of detention. It goes further by holding the 
accessibility of the information in an understandable language or the review of the decision 
of detention by a higher Court as key elements of assessment of arbitrariness. But the 
WGAD points out that to come to the conclusion that the detention is arbitrary, the 
violation of those guarantees must be “a matter of a high degree of gravity”. 
 
3.2.2 Second subsection Guarantees in and Conditions of detention 
 
This subsection aims at drawing the legal standards applicable in detention. It will be 
descriptive and for this reason brief. The report of Amnesty international “Migration 
Related detention” has been a useful tool in the writing of this part118. 
 
The migrants, asylum seekers or refugees deprived of their liberty must be informed of the 
reasons for the detention in a language they understand properly. This right is protected by 
article 9.2 ICCPR and 5.2 ECHR. 
Once the decision has been taken and the migrants informed, he must be entitled to an 
effective remedy as prescribed in articles 9.4 ICCPR and 5.3 ECHR. The HRC has précised 
that to be effective the Court must be able to reverse the decision
119
. The same principle is 
guaranteed by article 5.4 ECHR. The question before the Committee and the Court has 
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been whether or not this remedy must take place in front of a jurisdiction or a simple 
authority. The ECHR held that when the decision to detain is taken by an administrative 
body which does not have the prerequisites of a court the remedy must be done in front of 
one which ensures “the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of 
deprivation of liberty”120. 
In the same spirit, the notion of court is not limited to a “court of justice” in the ICCPR. No 
definition of “court” has been drawn by the HRC from article 9 ICCPR. But, article 14 on 
procedural guarantees in Civil and Criminal trials requires the court to be an independent 
and impartial body. An administrative authority granted with such qualities can be 
considered as a “court”121 in some circumstances. 
 
The last guarantee is the right to compensation in case of detention in contravention with 
the convention and the covenant. Article 5(5) ECHR and 9(5) ICCPR guarantee such right. 
Nevertheless the two protections must be distinguished. The Committee does not need to 
review whether or not article 9 has been violated if a domestic court had already 
established that the detention was unlawful, to ascertain whether or not the victim is 
entitled to compensation. On the other hand, the ECHR has to do so, because it can only 
grant compensation if the detention has been established as being in contravention of the 
provisions of article 5(1)
122
. 
 
On the condition of detention, both the covenant and the convention prohibit the subjection 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees without any exception.   
Article 3 ECHR is applicable to cases where he is detained awaiting expulsion: “the serious 
overcrowding and absence of sleeping facilities, combined with the inordinate length of the 
period” amount to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3123. The cumulative effects of 
those conditions lead to the violation of article 3.   
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Article 7 ICCPR lays down the same prohibition
124
, but article 10 of the Covenant deals 
specifically with the conditions in case of detention. Detainees must be treated humanely 
and their dignity must be respected and the absence of material resources cannot justify the 
violation of this principle
125
.  
Other instruments and treaties deal with the conditions of detention and hold the respect for 
the dignity of alien in detention as fundamental and inalienable
126
.  
 
In EU law, the article 18 of the Return directive is quite exhaustive on the conditions of 
detention of irregular migrants. It guarantees contact with the outside world, an obligation 
for states to have specialized detention facilities for the removal procedure, it points out 
that vulnerable persons must be the object of a particular care and that organizations must 
have access to the facilities
127
. The absence of extensive dispositions on the conditions of 
detention can be explained for two reasons.  
First, the detention facilities vary from a state member to another and it would be difficult 
to set up standards which could not be fulfilled by some countries. 
Second, it is generally considered that human rights law and other international instruments 
already applied to the detention of irregular migrants, any further issues in this matter are 
then the concern of the state and not of the Community. 
 
 
3.3 Section 3 Best practices and alternatives of detention 
 
3.3.1 First subsection Identifying Best Practices in Migration Detention 
 
Though the conditions of detention vary significantly from an EU Member State to another, 
and according to the closed centers, some elements and characteristics are commonly 
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found. For instance, most of the time centers are scattered or in overcrowded area where 
the attention of the local population cannot be attracted
128
.  
Another example is a consequence of the detention which is common to the centers and 
more or less strong according to the conditions: the vulnerability of the detainees. Their 
psychological well being is put at risk and even more when they already have vulnerability 
antecedents due to traumatic past experiences or inherent to their characters.  
Minors, pregnant woman, elderly fall in groups which are predetermined as being 
vulnerable. As such they are protected and should be treated with more care and not being 
the victim of any severe measure which could lead them to serious psychological problems.    
 
Nevertheless vulnerability can be the direct consequence of the detention. Nothing intra sec 
to the detained migrant presupposes any vulnerability but external factors such as the 
“prison like atmosphere” can have serious consequences on the person. It has been showed 
that “detention has the potential to harm any type of people: those with preexisting needs or 
otherwise healthy person”129. For this reason the human cost of detention is high and 
should be considered by authorities when deciding and implementing immigration policies. 
 
Sweden is often considered as a leading country in the best practices concerning migration 
related detention. In 2009 the European Committee for the prevention of Torture, in its 
preliminary observations, was satisfied by the conditions of detention and the staff in 
charge of the facilities. It nevertheless found that the accessibility of the staff to health 
records of detainees was inacceptable and reminded that Sweden must avoid detaining 
aliens in common prisons as it happened in few cases
130
 which show that even leading 
countries can easily have non proper practices. 
 
The major difference between Sweden and other EU countries on the question of detention 
is that those detention centers are run by staff with a social education background and not 
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by the police. It ensures that detainees are not treated as common criminals and clearly 
mark the difference between the two types of institutions and their purposes. This feature 
should be supported by EU in its Member states and abroad. 
 
Actually, to find examples of best practices in matter of migration detention the attention 
should be focused outside EU Member States.   
 
3.3.2 Second subsection Alternatives of detention 
 
Alternatives have been developed those past 10 years. Numerous international 
organizations have called for the development of alternatives
131
. The UNHCR in 2006 
through a report on alternatives to detention of asylum seekers and refugees urged states to 
take steps towards those solutions
132
. In EU, the parliamentary assembly has deplored the 
growing use of detention and recalled that states should consider alternatives
133
 and that 
minimum rules on conditions of detention must be agreed by Member States.  
 
It is clear that the debate is not whether or not authorities should use detention but whether 
or not detention should be the default system in specific cases. We are far from the 
prohibition of detention in immigration cases but there are possibilities to drastically 
diminish its use. 
 
The state the most referred to in matter of alternatives is Australia. After several 
condemnations from the HRC and the international community of its automatic mandatory 
detention without any time limit, it has developed alternatives applying to all immigration 
cases though it has as well acknowledged that mandatory detention is an essential 
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component of strong border control
134
. It still applies mandatory detention to all 
unauthorized arrivals for the purpose of health check, identity and security check
135
.  
 
The main step forward is the development of alternatives of detention - which are still  
measures depriving migrants of their liberty - and alternatives to detention - which aim at 
restricting the liberty of movement. Those last alternatives have been particularly 
developed for asylum seekers. 
Alternatives of detention go from the immigration residential housing –a secure and closed 
environment in the community or on detention centre grounds with restricted outside 
access- to community detention –live in the community with reporting requirement and 
support of NGOs.  
 
Those alternatives have proved to be efficient. Political will to implement such alternatives 
is the brake to their developments. 
 
 
3.4 Section 4 Migration detention in Turkey 
 
Turkey has been several times pointing out by organizations and international bodies 
concerning the detention of third country nationals concerning the absence of remedy, the 
length of detention and the conditions of detention amounting to degrading treatment. In 
2007, the organization HCA published a report on the situation of asylum seekers in 
detention and through interviews with detained refugees drawn up a state of “foreigners’ 
guesthouses” in which the absence of safeguards was highlighting136. The same year the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was stressing that  
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there are no remedies for the foreigners awaiting expulsion to challenge their 
detention and no control over the detention by a judicial authority. It may be true 
that in some cases the person to be deported spends only a few days at the 
guesthouse. But in others, where there are difficulties obtaining valid travel 
documents (as appears to be the case for many African migrants), the detention can 
last months and even more than a year 
137
 
 
And, in 2008 the EU Progress Report of Turkey, assessing the progress in borders tasks and 
the readmission agreement concluded that there had been “little progress” on management 
of irregular migrants in Turkey, describing conditions and standards of detention which did 
not meet the international requirements
138
. 
Indeed, Turkey has been “accommodating” foreigners in “guesthouses”. This type of 
accommodation is not recognized under Turkish law as administrative detention though it 
has been acknowledged that it amounts to deprivation of liberty
139
. As not recognized as 
administrative detention, no review of the decision by a court had been set up.  
 
Few cases on the conditions of detention in the foreigner guesthouses have actually been 
brought in front of the ECHR. This probably due to the fact that international organizations 
do not have access to foreigners’ guesthouses140 and that the access to lawyers is difficult 
for detainees. It must be noted that Turkey is not signatory of the Optional  Protocol to the 
UN Convention Against Torture which establish a system of regular visits undertaken by 
independent international organizations and  national bodies to places where people are 
deprived of their liberty to prevent torture and other cruel and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Nothing in this circular address this issue, but the project financed 
by EU provides that international organizations will have access to the removal centers. 
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Among the few cases, the EctHR had found in Z.N.S v. Turkey a violation of article 5§4 as 
the Turkish legal system did not provide with a remedy for a detention and deportation 
decision and a violation of article 5§1 for the absence of procedure setting time limits for 
the detention in domestic law
141
. 
In addition the Court, in Charahili v. Turkey, found a violation of article 3 of the 
Convention. It held that the conditions of detention of the applicant amounted to degrading 
treatment. However, considering the fact that it could not verify the veracity of the 
applicant’s allegations, the court did not base its ruling on the material conditions of 
detention. It declared that the prolonged detention of the applicant in an ordinary police 
detention facility, which purpose is not immigration detention, did not meet the 
requirements of article 3 as according to the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Punishment the “conditions in police 
stations will frequently – if not invariably – be inadequate for prolonged periods of 
detention”142 in immigration cases.   
 
In the above mentioned case Z.N.S v. Turkey the Court came to the conclusion that the 
conditions of detention were not so severe as to amount to treatment contrary to article 3. 
The Court acknowledged that the undetermined period of time of detention could cause 
feeling of anxiety to the applicant, however other allegations concerning the conditions of 
detention were not considered as founded by the Court
143
. It is worth noted that, as no 
independent body has access to the guesthouses, it had to base its assessment of the 
material conditions on the photograph of the facility provided by both Turkish authorities 
and the applicant.  
Turkey, in its alignment with European standards, has many issues to work on concerning 
the detention of third country nationals. 
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A positive step was taken in March 2010; the Turkish Ministry of Interior issued a circular 
on the fight against illegal migration
144. The “foreigner guesthouses” will be from now on 
referred as “removal centers”. Though the vocabulary used avoids “detention”, it is clear 
that those removal centers aim at depriving irregular migrants of their liberty by detaining 
them pending removal. The annex 1 of the circular lays principles on the physical 
conditions in the centers. 
The principles are in accordance with the minimum standards set by international law. 
Notably, in accordance with articles 9.2 ICCPR and 5.2 ECHR, the principle 6 holds that 
the irregular migrants must be informed of the reason of their detention and of the available 
legal remedies in a language they understand. Those remedies will have to be assessed; the 
body in charge of reviewing the decisions of detention will have to be independent and 
impartial to be in accordance with articles 9.4 ICCPR and 5.3 ECHR. Another significant 
positive step is the principle 16 which lays that the police personnel must be specifically 
trained to work in those centers and be in contact with irregular migrants
145
.  
In addition to those principles, the circular sets that, on request, irregular migrants must 
have access to the UNHCR in the center.  
 
However, the circular does not refer to any precise time limit of the detention. The changes 
prepared in the law of foreigners will probably address this question. Following EU 
standards, Turkey would logically limit the detention in removal centers to 6 months and 
18 months in cases where the third country national does not cooperate or where there is a 
delay in the obtaining of the necessary documentation from the third country
146
. The 
WGAD pointed out in its report in 2007 that there were difficulties obtaining valid travel 
documents mainly in the case of African migrants
147
. Turkey has not yet signed any 
readmission agreement with an African Country. Therefore the procedure of removal is still 
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not facilitated to this continent. This issue may then persist and those migrants will fall 
under the 18 months exception, if there will be such limitation, similar to EU. 
The circular leads to think that following the ECHR standards
148
 Turkey will not require 
the detention to be the last resort. As long as the person entered or stayed illegally and that 
the procedure of removal is carried on, no circumstances particular to the individual will be 
required to detain. The circular refers however to alternative premises where the irregular 
migrants could be detained if indicated by the governorate
149
. But, no further precision is 
given on the nature of those alternatives premises. 
 
All those changes are parallel to the refurbishment, construction, equipment of four 
removal centers with national Turkish founds
150
. Indeed, the building of removal centers is 
identified as a need by this circular. In some provinces the number of irregular migrants is 
still more important than the actual capacity in the facilities. The 2 removal centers 
financed by EU are taking part in this effort of change in the way of dealing with irregular 
migration. 
It seems that Turkey in its quest to EU membership has integrated the ideas, concepts of the 
Union concerning the management of irregular migration. A country with few experiences 
in this area, just starting its reform process, Turkey can still choose to have a more 
comprehensive approach towards the issue and to opt for alternatives of detention for 
instance.  
 
This circular has been welcomed in the Progress Report of 2010 as well as the preparation 
of the revision of the law on foreigners. Nevertheless, Turkey is called to fully implement 
the principles and to address the issues raised by the judgments in front of the EctHR
151
. 
The coming years will be crucial for Turkey, it will have to prove that those significant 
changes in its legislation will be reflected in the reality.  
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CHAPTER 4  OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FINANCING OF 
EXTRATERRITORIAL REMOVAL CENTERS 
 
This part will concentrate on the ICCPR and the ECHR for which both Turkey and EU 
Member States are parties. Actually, EU is not directly party to any Convention. Thus, it 
could not be held responsible for any violation of their dispositions. Nevertheless the 
European Court of Human rights considered that a Member state can be held responsible 
for the actions of a European body
152
. 
 
There is no point in discussing the legality of the financing of the removal centers by EU in 
itself. Indeed, as seen in chapter 3, the detention of irregular migrants is not prohibited 
under international law. Consequently, in any case financing the construction of facilities 
for this purpose can be regarded as violating any principle of international law. The 
purpose is legal. The issue here is whether or not EU could be held responsible for any 
violation of the rights of the detainees in the centers it will have financed. 
 
It is generally accepted that a state is responsible for any violation of an individual’s rights 
if this person is subjected to its jurisdiction wherever this violation occurred
153
. According 
to the EctHR “the term “jurisdiction” [referred to in article 1 of the Convention] is not 
limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be 
involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own 
territory”154. The scope of obligations under the ICCPR may at first appear as narrower. 
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Indeed, article 2 is limited to “persons subject to a State’s jurisdiction and within its 
territory”. But the Human Rights Committee held that “it would be unconscionable to so 
interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a state party to 
perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which violations 
could not perpetrate on its own territory”155. Clearly, the HRC has as well opted for an 
expansive view of the state’s obligation under the Covenant. 
The fact that those removal centers are situated outside EU Member States’ territories is 
not a bar to the jurisdiction of those states. 
The HRC as well expressed that what actually maters to establish the responsibility of a 
state is not “the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between 
the individual and the state in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant wherever they occurred”156. What kind of relationship does the Committee refer 
to? 
The answer can be found in the General Comment 31: “a state party must respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control 
even if not situated within the territory of the state party”157.        
The effective control of the state determines whether or not it has jurisdiction and 
consequently its responsibility for any violation of rights. The EctHR in Loizidou v. Turkey 
held that 
 
 the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of 
military action - whether lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective control of an 
area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control 
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate 
local administration
158
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But, in Bankovic v. Belgium and Others it precised that extraterritorial jurisdiction must be 
regarded as exceptional. According to this case it exists as “a consequence of military 
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that 
territory” and when there is exercise of “some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by that government”159. 
Clearly, Turkey acquiesced the financing of the removal centers, and the building of such 
facilities is part of its immigration policy on border control which comes from its sovereign 
right to decide who can entry and stay on its territory. It, then, falls within the powers 
which Turkey normally exercises. 
But the elements of Bankovic refer to military occupation in which agents of the state are 
involved and exclude cases where there is not occupation but where the state’s acts 
nonetheless affect individuals. This case is actually regarded as controversial in many ways 
by some scholars as it narrows the scope of application of the ECHR and though it has been 
referred to in the following jurisprudence it must not lead to the ignorance of other cases 
where jurisdiction was not defined so restrictively. 
 
In the financing of removal centers, a tiny area is concerned and the control, if there is, is 
not obtained by exercise of military action but through financing. In addition, EU will not 
be running the centers. The Turkish authorities, administration will be in charge of it. 
In Cyprus v. Turkey, the Court found that a state can be held responsible for the act of the 
local administration, in another territory,”which services there survive by virtue of its 
military and other support”160. But still, in this case again, military occupation led to the 
overall control of the area and thus the jurisdiction of Turkey over it. 
Loukis Loucaides, in an EctHR judgment opinion, expressed the idea that jurisdiction “may 
also extend in the form of the exercise of domination or effective influence through 
political, financial, military and other substantial support of a government of another state”. 
To him, “the test should always be whether the person who claims to be within the 
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jurisdiction of a state […] can show that the act […] was the result of the exercise of 
authority by the state concerned”161. 
It could be argued that EU does not exercise any authority as simply providing the funds. It 
gives an “assistance budget” to Turkey. But the Union is participating with 15 000 000 
Euros on 19 433 333 that the project costs. It would not be viable without its funding. 
By financing in major part those centers it can clearly play a dominant role on the way it 
should be conducted. However, as previously said, EU is only financing the constructions; 
the centers will be run by Turkish officials through Turkish funds. 
In Ilascu and others v. Moldova, the EctHR held that even if Moldova was not in control of 
the region where the violations occurred, it had positive obligations to fulfill under the 
Convention as it was formally within its authority and officially part of its territory. Here, 
the effective control of the territory was not required, but Moldova is officially recognized 
as having jurisdiction over it. It consequently had positive obligations towards this area 
under the Convention. This judgment was criticized for too much stretching the notion of 
jurisdiction.  
The same critic could be drawn if EU would be considered responsible for violations of 
rights of individuals it never had the control on. By financing the construction EU is clearly 
dominant in any activities, related projects during the period of construction. It must 
nevertheless be noted that the funds will actually be managed by a Turkish administrative 
body: the Central Finance and Contracts Units of the Minister of Treasury. It could be an 
element limiting even more EU responsibility as the Union will not be deciding how the 
money will be distributed in the different areas of the project.  
Clearly, to determine if EU has a responsibility in the violation of rights of detained 
irregular migrants, it must be determined whether or not the contribution of EU had an 
effect on the occurrence of this violation. EU can only be considered as having control of 
those centers concerning their constructions and actually the training of the staff which is 
part of the project. 
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Indeed, in this project, the personnel of the centers will be trained on EU standards. The EU 
funds will consequently be partly directed to this aim. 
Does EU have any obligation regarding the training of the staff? 
 
Under the U.N Convention Against Torture, Member States have to ensure that  
 
education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully 
included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical 
personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, 
interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, 
detention or imprisonment.
162
 
 
There is no requirement of “jurisdiction and control” in this article. Thus, EU has a positive 
obligation, as torture must be prevented and prohibited, to make sure that this project will 
provide proper trainings. 
To conclude, EU would not be held responsible for any violation of detainees’ rights 
having regard to the characteristics of the project: though EU is dominant in the financing 
of the construction, it will not be in the running. EU is providing the facilities for the 
detention, detention which is permitted under international law as seen previously.  
However, EU will still be responsible in the case of irregular migrants sent to Turkey and 
detained in any removal centers in case of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR and 7 
ICCPR as it was stated in chapter 2. 
 
The additional question here is whether or not EU could be held responsible for a 
deprivation of liberty in those centers following removal which would not meet the 
international standards. 
The HRC has found violations for deportation while the individual was facing a foreseeable 
risk of death or torture but it never did in other circumstances
163
. The General Comment 31 
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 UNCAT, article 10 
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 JOSEPH, 2004 p 94 
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refers to the foreseeability of an “irreparable harm” and gives as example right to life 
(article 6 ICCPR) and freedom from torture (article 7 ICCPR)
164
.  
The ECHR held on this question:”whether an issue could be raised by the prospect of 
arbitrary detention contrary to article 5 is even less clear” while comparing this hypothesis 
to the prospect of flagrant denial of fair trial under article 6 of the Convention in case of 
deportation. But the Court in this case did not focus on this point as the applicant did not 
bring elements indicating that he would actually face such risk. Therefore, it came to the 
conclusion that there was no forseeability of such event: “a possible future unspecified 
problem with the authorities is too remote and hypothetical basis for attracting the 
protection of the Convention in this regard”165. 
 
Thus, having regard to the state of international human rights law, if the deprivation of 
liberty does not meet the guarantees under the Covenant and the Convention, it is unlikely 
that the person facing such risk will not be deported. 
But, if the conditions of detention while deprive of liberty amount to treatment contrary to 
article 3 ECHR and 6, 7 ICCPR, the Court could find a violation of those articles in case of 
removal. 
 
EU could not be held responsible in case of violation of detainees rights in the removal 
centers it will have financed. It will not exercise any authority via, for instance, fundings 
for the running. Nevertheless, it could be found responsible in case of violation of right in 
to life or freedom from torture in those centers in case of removal. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The project by its characteristics is a perfect illustration of the evolution of the way 
migration is dealt with:  an extraterritorial project on an issue still considered as a reserved 
domain under international law. 
 
In nature, migration has obviously an international dimension. It involves individuals of 
different nationalities crossing borders of national territories. But, the old maxim according 
to which it is a ” matter of well established international law and subject to its territory 
obligations, [that] a state has the right to control entry of non nationals into its territory” is 
still persisting under international law. Though migration is recognized as a transboundary 
issue and that states have come to negotiate on it, this principle is still holding as a bar to 
any treaties specifically dealing with the status and the rights of migrants. Consequently, in 
principle, it still falls under the sovereign right of Turkey to decide which policy to adopt 
towards irregular migration within the framework of Human Rights Law.  
 
However, the externalization of EU migration policies coupled with the will to become a 
member of EU has led to the “Europeanization” of Turkish migration laws and policies. In 
any case the action of EU could be regarded as amounting to intervention even though the 
Union has to use on some issues strong incentives to make Turkey do what it deems 
necessary to attain international and EU standards. A possible membership to the Union 
can in itself be regarded as such incentive. It would be nonetheless naïve to believe that EU 
is simply supporting changes in Turkey to facilitate its membership; it clearly aims at 
promoting its interests concerning the management of migration flows.  
The removal centers are enshrined in this process of Europeanization and by improving the 
capacity of management of Turkey, they aim at participating in the decrease of the number 
of irregular migrants coming to EU Member States territories.  
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This project comes at a point where Turkey is simultaneously undertaking important legal 
changes in the Turkish Law of Foreigners and negotiating readmission agreements. Those 
agreements are under international law crucial to ensure a legal procedure for the removal 
of third country nationals to a transit country. It ensures that the transfer will be facilitated 
and that the procedure will be carried out until its final aim, avoiding releasing individuals 
in absence of possible removal or of indefinite detention in worse cases. For this reason, 
readmission agreements are facilitated by the removal centers and the running of the 
centers is actually facilitated as well in return as non irregular migrants would be left in a 
black hole situation. 
 
The project is a brick in the wall. It could be reproached to EU to start building removal 
centers in a country where the practice still show important loopholes on the treatment of 
migrants in the practice.   But it can be opposed that EU is actually providing the means to 
Turkey to handle migrant cases notably when they are under a removal procedure. Such 
argument actually lead to think that those centers are a minor contribution compared to all 
the challenges that Turkey is facing and will face. 
 
Nothing in International Law is a bar to the financing of removal centers by EU: the 
purpose is legal as far as detaining irregular migrants is allowed under contemporary law 
and as far as EU has not imposed such project by any coercive means. The problem is that 
this project promotes the use of detention whereas the international organizations and 
bodies are calling to diminish its use. Those calls have clearly still not had an echo in any 
binding instruments. Detention still appears to most states as the only way to carry 
removal. The debate on the detention of irregular migrants is not whether or not they 
should be detained but still how they should.  
 
Through this project EU wants to promote its best practices on detention but it possibly 
missed the opportunity to promote better practices. Encouraging Turkey to adopt 
alternatives of detention and to opt for a staff with social background and not security one 
would have been a great step forward. 
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When it comes to the responsibility of EU for the financing, it is limited by the fact that it 
is only giving funds for the construction of the facilities. It would have probably been much 
more challenging under international law if it had financed the running of the center in a 
long term perspective.  
This thesis sought to show that the EU extraterritorial project is enshrined in deep 
normative and, hopefully, practice changes which make it relevant in the situation and not 
infringing any principle of international law. But it should be kept in mind that this type of 
extraterritorial project in domain which traditionally falls in the reserved domain of states is 
meant to promote domestic interests.  
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